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Effects of Mental Accounting on Intertemporal
Choice
Niklas Karlsson, Tommy Gärling, and Marcus Selart
Department of Psychology
Göteborg University
Karlsson, N., Gärling, T., & Selart, M. Effects of mental
accounting on intertemporal choice. Göteborg Psychological
Reports, 1997, 27, No. 5. Two experiments with undergraduates
as subjects were carried out with the aim of replicating and
extending previous results showing that the implication of the
behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (H. M. Shefrin & R. H. Thaler,
1988) that people classify assets in different mental accounts
(current income, current assets, and future income) may explain
how consumption choices are influenced by temporary income
changes. In both experiments subjects made fictitious choices
between paying for a good in cash or according to a more
expensive installment plan after they had received an income
which was either less, the same, or larger than usual. In
Experiment 1 subjects were supposed to have savings so that
the total assets were equal, whereas in Experiment 2 the total
assets varied. The results of both experiments supported the
role of mental accounts in demonstrating that subjects were
unwilling to pay in cash after an income decrease even though
they had access to saved money. Thus, in effect they chose to
pay more for the good than they had to. Indicating a need for
further refinement of the concept of mental account, choices to
pay in cash after an income decrease tended to be more frequent
when the consumption and savings motives were compatible
than when they were incompatible. Furthermore, increasing the
total assets made subjects more willing to pay in cash after an
income decrease.
Key words: Decision making, mental accounting, prior outcomes,
intertemporal choice.
How people cognitively describe decision outcomes is the focus of much
research (Gärling, Karlsson, Romanus, & Selart, in press). In this more
general context mental accounting refers to a process of categorizing
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outcomes (Henderson & Peterson, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In
their behavioral life-cycle hypothesis, Shefrin and Thaler (1988, 1992;
Thaler & Shefrin, 1981) similarly used mental accounting as a description
of how people code and impose restrictions on monetary assets. According
to this theory, people categorize assets in three mental accounts: current
income, current assets, and future income. An important implication for
economic theory is that the principle of fungability of money is violated
(Thaler, 1985, 1990).
Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 456) defined a mental account as ”an
outcome frame which specifies (i) the set of elementary outcomes that are
evaluated jointly and the manner in which they are combined, and (ii) a
reference outcome that is considered neutral or normal.” In presenting
different scenarios to subjects, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that
a larger percentage would buy a new theater ticket if they had lost the
equivalent amount of money as compared to the percentage of subjects
that would replace a lost theater ticket. As an explanation of these results
they suggested that subjects evaluated the loss of the ticket and the price
of a new ticket in the same mental account while the loss of money and
the price of a ticket were evaluated separately. This coding of outcomes
into mental accounts is specific to the decision to be made. It can be
distinguished from the mental accounts referred to by Shefrin and Thaler
in their behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (1988, 1992) which instead are a
priori held mental accounts that are part of people’s financial knowledge.
Ranyard (1995) makes a conceptual distinction between the formation of
specific mental accounts and on-going mental accounts. He argues that
the latter are higher-order and more stable cognitive structures. Although
these on-going mental accounts have attracted some research (Heath,
1995; Hirst, Joyce, & Schadewald, 1994; Selart, Karlsson & Gärling, in
press; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992; Thaler, 1990; Winett & Lewis, 1995),
the impact they have on decisions have not been extensively investigated.
In line with the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (Shefrin & Thaler,
1988, 1992), Karlsson, Gärling, and Selart (1996) found that the
propensity to consume reflected in fictitious buying decisions was lower
when subjects had to use their current assets rather than current income,
although total assets were the same in the two cases. Alternative
explanations based on the renewable-resources model (Linville & Fischer,
1991) and the loss-sensitivity principle (Gärling & Romanus, 1996;
Romanus, Karlsson, & Gärling, in press) were not consistent with the
results. In contrast to the hypothesis of mental accounting, these theories
predict that the motive for consumption (i.e., replacing something broken
or buying something desired for long) would interact with type of income
change (i.e., income decrease and using current assets or income increase
and using current income) in determining the propensity to buy.
In intertemporal choice (Loewenstein, 1988), immediate utility is
weighed against future utility. Restricting the use of assets by forming
mental accounts may serve the purpose of a self-control device. The aim of
self-control devices is to strengthen power to resist immediate
consumption to gain larger benefits in the future. Avoiding tempting
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situations, precommitment, and bundling of costs are examples of such
devices (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). Mental accounting may, as a part of
a financial knowledge (Ranyard, 1995), in contrast to other self-control
devices be formed on a more general level and not in relation to specific
situations or desires. As such a more general self-control device, its use is
of major concern for investigation. More caution and unwillingness to use
current assets than current income may reflect that long-term preferences
to a larger extent are considered when using current assets. In line with
this, we wanted to investigate the influence of compatibility between
saving and consumption motives and the amount of total assets on mental
accounting, and more specifically that these factors may be more
important when using current assets than current income.
The aim of the present study was thus to replicate and extend the
previous results (Karlsson et al., 1996) supporting mental accounting as
an explanation of the effect of prior outcomes in the form of temporary
income changes on intertemporal choices. Specifically, since saving
motives have received considerable attention in earlier work, as for
instance in Keynes (1936), Katona (1975), Ferber (1973), and Lindqvist
(1981) (see also Wärneryd, 1989), it may be questioned whether such
motives affect how willing people are to use savings (current assets) when
facing buying decisions. Lindqvist (1981) distinguished between four
main motives for saving: cash management, buffer for unforeseen
emergencies, financial means for attaining a desired goal, and wealth
management. There are also different motives for consumption, as for
instance buying to replace something or buying something that has been
desired for a long time. When questions about whether or not to use
current savings are at stake, an important factor may be the compatibility
between the motive held for these savings and the motive for
consumption. Our hypothesis is that unwillingness to use current savings
as predicted from the concept of mental account is reduced if the motives
for saving and consumption are compatible. That is, if the consumption
motive is, for instance, to replace something accidentally broken, the
willingness to use current savings is expected to be greater if the saving
motive is to have a buffer for unforeseen expenses (compatible) than if it
is to attain something desired (non-compatible).
The prediction from the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (Shefrin &
Thaler, 1988, 1992) is that the propensity to consume is greater if money
is taken from a current spendable income account than from current
assets. In the present study, subjects are presented with hypothetical
buying situations. In these situations they are facing choices between
paying immediately in cash or paying according to a more expensive
installment plan. By presenting different income-change conditions in
Experiment 1, money for consumption was available in different mental
accounts. This procedure thus makes it possible to compare willingness to
use money from different mental accounts to pay in cash rather than
choosing the installment-plan alternative. In line with the purpose of the
study to investigate the importance of mental accounts for how people’s
consumption choices are affected by temporary income changes, the total
No. 5:27, 4
assets available to subjects were equal. In contrast, in Experiment 2 total
assets were systematically varied to investigate whether willingness to
pay in cash from different mental accounts are equally affected by the
total amount of saved money. If it is not, this would be another factor
which modify how mental accounts constrain consumption choices.
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the use of mental accounts
in buying decisions and, in particular, to investigate the significance of
compatibility between saving and consumption motives for such decisions.
Subjects were asked to make hypothetical payment decisions, either to
pay for a durable good immediately in cash or by a more expensive
installment plan. They were presented with situations in which the
income was less, the same, or larger than usual. There were four such
income-change situations; one in which money for consumption is
available as an income increase, one in which income increase plus
ordinary income can be used, one in which ordinary income plus savings
can be used, and, finally, one in which savings have to be used. According
to the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992), the
propensity to pay in cash should decrease when ordinary income plus
savings have to be used1, and decrease further when savings alone have to
be used.
In addition to the different income-change conditions varied within
subjects, different groups of subjects were given four different versions in
which different motives for saving and consumption were crossed. The
motives for saving were either saving for a buffer or saving for a desired
goal, and the motives for consumption either to replace something
accidentally broken or to buy something desired for long. Hence, in the
saving for a buffer conditions, the motive for consumption was either
compatible or noncompatible, and likewise, in the saving for a desired
goal conditions the consumption motive was either compatible or
noncompatible. The hypothesis is that the unwillingness to use savings
will decrease when saving and consumption motives are compatible.
Method
                                                       
1 Buying for the good according to an installment plan is identical to using future income.
According to the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis, people are more reluctant to use future
income than current assets or current income. Apparently, since subjects in all conditions made
the same choices between paying in cash or according to an installment plan, we were not able
to test this implication of the hypothesis. The reason why we asked subjects to make financing
decisions rather than buying decisions as in Karlsson et al. (1996) was that this forced them to
choose between different accounts.
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Subjects
Sixty four undergraduates at Göteborg University, 36 women and 28
men, participated as subjects in return for the equivalent of $7 in
payment. Subjects were randomly assigned to four different groups, with
16 subjects in each group and with an equal number of women and men
in the four groups.
Materials
Subjects were presented with fictitious choices to pay for a durable good
immediately in cash or by a more expensive installment plan. Every
subject was presented with 16 situations in which income change, saving
amount, and product varied. There were four different income-change
conditions: either an income increase larger than the price of the product,
an income increase smaller than the price, an ordinary income, or an
income decrease. The amount of savings was varied so that total assets
were equal for the income-change conditions. The products that the
subjects imagined that they bought were a CD player, a bookcase, an
answering machine, or a writing table. For the situations with the CD
player and the bookcase, all amounts (price, amount of income change,
and amount of savings) were twice as high as for the situations with the
answering machine and the writing table.
In the condition with an income increase larger than the price, subjects
were told that they had received an income increase of $2152 or $430, and
that they had $215 or $430, respectively, saved in a bank account. In the
condition in which an income increase was smaller than the price,
subjects had received an income increase of $72 or $143, and their savings
were $358 or $717, respectively. When subjects were told that they had
received their ordinary income, they had $430 or $860 in savings. In the
income-decrease condition, the income decrease was $215 or $430 and
they had $645 or $1290, respectively, in savings. The price for the product
they bought was either $143 or $287. The buying situations were
displayed and responded to on a computer.
Procedure
Subjects served in groups of four or less. In a general instruction
subjects were told that they would be presented with fictitious buying
scenarios which they were asked to imagine and respond to as if they
were real. Subjects were introduced to a pre-test example before they
started.
The experiment used a mixed factorial design with consumption motive
(2 levels) and saving motive (2 levels) as between-subject factors and
income change (4 levels) as a within-subject factor. For half of the subjects
                                                       
2 These amounts were in Swedish Crowns expressed in even hundreds ($1 is approximately
equal to SEK 7).
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the consumption motive was to attain something long desired. The
subjects in these conditions were asked to imagine that they owned a
product (e.g., a CD player) but that they had been thinking about buying
a new and better one for a long time. For the other half of subjects the
consumption motive was to replace something accidentally broken. They
were, for instance, asked to imagine that their CD player had accidentally
broken and that they therefore wanted to buy a new one. The two
different saving motives were either to save in order to have a buffer for
unforeseen expenses or to save in order to be able to buy something
special they wanted to have. Half of the subjects were presented with the
former and the other half with the latter of these two saving motives.
Altogether there were thus four groups; subjects who saved for a buffer
with either compatible or noncompatible consumption motive and subjects
ho saved for attaining a desired goal with compatible or noncompatible
consumption motive.
In all situations subjects were asked to imagine that they had found a
product that they liked and wanted to buy, and that they could pay either
immediately in cash or by a five-month installment plan. Subjects were
then told that they had received an income change or an ordinary income
and how much they had saved in a bank account. Furthermore, subjects
were told that they normally had $143 (or $72) left over at the end of each
month and that it was not possible to increase this amount by cutting
down on expenses. For each situation subjects were asked to make the
choice as if it was real between paying $287 (or $143) immediately in cash
or paying by installment $64 (or $32) immediately plus $64 (or $32) each
of the following four months. They were also asked to rate how likely they
were to choose the way they did. Ratings were made on a continuous scale
from 0 to 100, where 0 was defined as not very likely, 50 as rather likely,
and 100 as very likely.
The scenarios were presented to subjects in an individually randomized
order. The sessions lasted for about 20 minutes, after which subjects were
debriefed and paid.
Results
The propensity to pay in cash was computed by multiplying each choice
with the likelihood rating. Choices were coded as 1 if paying in cash and -
1 if paying by installment. Thus, the dependent variable ranged from -100
to 1003 with a positive value indicating a preference to pay immediately in
cash and a negative value indicating a preference to postpone payment by
paying by installment.
As can be seen in Table 1, the propensity to pay in cash decreases in
the ordinary income and income-decrease conditions. In these conditions,
                                                       
3 All analyses reported below were also performed on choice proportions with almost identical
results.
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current savings have to be used and this result is thus in line with the
prediction from the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis. A 2 (saving motive:
buffer vs. goal) by 2 (consumption motive: replacing something broken vs.
buying something long desired) by 4 (income change: income increase
larger than price vs. income increase smaller than price vs. ordinary
income vs. income decrease) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last
factor revealed that the main effect of income change was significant,
F(1.98, 118.9) = 72.27, p<.001, after Greenhouse-Geisser correction of the
degrees of freedom. According to separate Bonferroni corrected t-tests at
p=.05, all differences between income-change conditions in propensity to
pay in cash were significant, except the difference between the income-
increase conditions (larger than the price vs. smaller than the price).
Table 1
Mean Propensity to Pay in Cash in the Different Income-change
Conditions
Income-change condition
Income
decrease
Ordinary
income
Income increase
(< price)
Income increase
(> price)
6.6 55.0 77.1 82.3
In Figure 1 the propensity to pay in cash in the income-change
conditions for the compatible or noncompatible consumption and saving
motives are displayed. A three-way interaction effect was expected from
the hypothesis that the propensity to use current savings to pay in cash is
increasing when motives for saving and consumption are compatible.
According to the ANOVA, the expected three-way interaction between
income change, saving motive, and consumption motive was significant,
F(1.98, 118.9) = 3.98, p<.05, after Greenhouse-Geisser correction of the
degrees of freedom. However, the interaction was not exactly as expected.
As can be seen, there are differences between the different between-
subjects conditions when subjects received an income decrease or an
ordinary income. In these cases the propensity to use saved money for
paying in cash was lower when the saving motive was to have a buffer
and the consumption motive to buy something long desired rather than to
replace something broken. There were however no such effects of
compatibility between saving for something long desired and the two
consumption motives. Separate Bonferroni-corrected t-tests at p=.05
revealed that the only reliable differences were between the mean for the
noncompatible motives of saving to have a buffer and buying something
long desired and the other means in the income-decrease condition. In the
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different groups, the differences between income decrease and the
remaining within-subject conditions were significant. A significant
difference was also obtained between ordinary income and the income-
increase conditions when the saving motive was to have a buffer and the
consumption motive to buy something long desired.
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Figure 1. Mean propensity to pay in cash in different income-change
conditions for compatible and noncompatible saving and consumption
motives.
Discussion
The results supported the prediction from the behavioral life-cycle
hypothesis (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992) that people are more willing to
use current income than current assets for consumption. Overall, the
subjects were more prone to pay in cash than by a more expensive
installment plan in the conditions where they could use their current
income than in the conditions where they had to use current savings. Note
that in previous research it was found that subjects expected to consume
more from current income than current assets (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988,
1992), whereas the present results show a direct effect of mental accounts
on specific buying decisions.
Furthermore, the results partly supported the hypothesis that the
propensity to pay in cash when current savings had to be used increases if
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the motive for saving and consumption are compatible. When the saving
motive was to have a buffer, the willingness to use current savings was
greater for the compatible consumption motive to replace something
accidentally broken than for the noncompatible consumption motive.
However, when the saving motive was to attain a desired goal, there were
no differences between the compatible and noncompatible consumption
motives in the willingness to use current savings to pay in cash.
As a possible explanation of this latter result, irrespective of the saving
motive subjects may impose a limit on how much they want to use of their
savings. How large the amount is set for such a limit may be influenced
by several factors. The amount of savings may be one factor, the saving
motive another. To impose a limit and thus to have an amount of savings
left over is conceptually similar to the motive to have a buffer. This saving
motive has also been found to be regarded as more basic and important
(Lindqvist, 1981). In post-experimental interview questions asked to
subjects about the importance of different saving motives, 75 % regarded
saving for a buffer to be more important than attaining a desired goal.
Hence, when the motive for saving is to have a buffer for unforeseen
expenses, replacing something accidentally broken is compatible and
buying something long desired is noncompatible with this saving motive.
However, when the saving motive is to attain a desired goal it is possible
that a lower amount is adopted as a limit and that the remaining money
is considered to be saved for attaining a desired goal. In this case, there
are thus mixed motives, both compatible and noncompatible with the
consumption motives.
Experiment 2
A temporary income change implies a change in total assets relative to
what is expected or normally received. That is, to receive an income
decrease or an income increase implies that the total assets are less or
more, respectively, compared to if an ordinary income had been received.
Although this perceived change in total assets cannot account for the
results of Experiment 1, it is conceivable that the amount of total assets
affect the propensity to pay in cash. In other words, the propensity to pay
in cash may vary with the amount of money available. However, as
emphasized in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), losses and
gains are evaluated differently. Furthermore, according to Peeters and
Czapinski (1990) and Taylor (1991), losses or negative events receive
greater attention and are processed more comprehensively. This may
imply that people consider total assets only when receiving an income
decrease.
Another possibility raised by the results of Experiment 1 is that
subjects impose a limit on how much they are willing to use of their
savings. If people adjust this limit to the amount of savings they have,
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then an effect of total assets on the propensity to pay in cash after an
income decrease will be counteracted.
As in Experiment 1, subjects were asked to make hypothetical payment
decisions, either to pay for a durable in cash or by a more expensive
installment plan. Subjects were presented with three different income-
change situations, one in which money for consumption is available as an
income increase, one in which ordinary income plus savings can be used,
and one income-decrease situation in which savings have to be used.
Furthermore, subjects were told that they had money saved in a bank
account. For each income-change condition there were four different
amounts of savings. In line with the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis
(Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992), it is expected that the propensity to pay in
cash is reduced for the ordinary-income condition where some current
savings have to be used and further reduced for the income-decrease
condition where current savings alone must be used. It is also expected
that the propensity to pay in cash is only affected by total assets in the
income-decrease condition.
In contrast to Experiment 1, only the noncompatible saving and
consumption motives were induced, that is, saving to attain a desired goal
but buying to replace something accidentally broken and saving to have a
buffer for unforeseen expenses but buying something desired for a long
time. In the previous experiment, the propensity to pay in cash was
greater when subjects had to use current savings that were saved for
attaining a desired goal than when the motive for saving was to have a
buffer. As a possible explanation of this unexpected difference, it was
hypothesized that saving to attain a desired goal is perceived as a mixed
motive, both compatible and noncompatible with the consumption motive
to replace something accidentally broken. In line with this, it is expected
that the propensity to pay in cash is greater for buying to replace
something broken when saving to attain a desired goal than for buying
something long desired when saving to have a buffer.
Method
Subjects
Thirty-two undergraduates at Göteborg University, 22 women and 10
men, participated in the study. They received the equivalent of $7 for
their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to two equally large
groups.
Materials
As in Experiment 1 subjects were presented with fictitious choices to
pay for a durable good immediately in cash or by a more expensive
installment plan. Every subject was presented with 24 scenarios in which
income change and saving amount varied. The income change was either
No. 5:27, 11
an income increase larger than the price of the durable, an ordinary
income (i.e., no income change), or an income decrease. Hence, money for
paying in cash was available as current income in the income-increase
condition, as current income plus current savings in the ordinary-income
condition, and as current savings in the income-decrease condition. In
each income-change condition there were four different situations in
which amount of savings available in a bank account varied. There were
furthermore two levels of income changes. One level was twice as high as
the other, and the price of the durable and the amounts of savings were
also twice as high for the high level.
In the income-change conditions subjects were told that they had
received either an income increase of $430 or $215, an ordinary income, or
an income decrease of $430 or $215. In income-change conditions at the
high level, subjects were told that they had $860, $1290, $1710, and
$2140 saved in a bank account. In the income-change conditions at the
low level, the saving amounts were $430, $645, $860, and $1070. The
durable good that subjects bought was a CD player. The price was $287
and $143 for the high and low levels, respectively.
Procedure
The procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1.
However, only the noncompatible consumption and saving motives were
used. Half of the subjects were asked to imagine that they owned a CD
player but that they had been thinking about buying a new and better one
for a long time. This group of subjects were also told that their savings
was a buffer for unforeseen expenses. The other half of subjects were
asked to imagine that their CD player had accidentally broken and that
they therefore wanted to buy a new one. For these subjects the saving
motive was to be able to buy something special they wanted to have.
For each situation subjects were asked to make a choice as if it was real
between paying $287 (or $143) immediately in cash or paying by
installment, $64 (or $32) immediately plus $64 (or $32) the following four
months. They were also asked to rate on a scale from 0 to 100 how likely
they were to choose the way they did.
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Results
As in Experiment 1, the dependent variable was computed by
multiplying each choice with its likelihood rating. It ranged from -100 to
100 where a positive value indicates a preference to pay immediately in
cash and a negative value a preference to pay by installment.
As Figure 2 reveals, the propensity to pay in cash is greater in the
income increase than in the ordinary income conditions and greater in the
ordinary income than in the income decrease conditions. A 2 (motive:
saving to have a buffer and buying something long desired vs. saving for a
goal and replacing something broken) by 3 (income change: income
decrease vs. ordinary income vs. income increase) by 4 (asset level: lowest
vs. second lowest vs. second highest vs. highest) by 2 (replicate: low vs.
high level) ANOVA with repeated measures on the three last factors was
performed. According to this ANOVA, the difference in propensity to pay
in cash between the three income-change conditions was significant,
F(1.42, 42.61) = 30.15, p<.001, after Greenhouse-Geisser correction of the
degrees of freedom. Separate Bonferroni corrected t-tests at p<.05
substantiated that there were significant differences in propensity to pay
in cash between all income-change conditions.
According to the ANOVA, there was also a significant main effect of
total asset level on the propensity to pay in cash, F(2.68, 80.44) = 9.06,
p<.001, after Greenhouse-Geisser correction of the degrees of freedom.
This effect was however modified by a significant two-way interaction
between income change and asset level, F(4.04, 121.25) = 6.23, p<.001,
after Greenhouse-Geisser correction of the degrees of freedom. Separate
repeated measures ANOVAs for each income-change condition revealed as
expected that asset level only had a significant effect on the propensity to
pay in cash in the income-decrease condition, F (3, 90) = 11.99, p<.001.
However, further tests by means of Bonferroni corrected t-tests at p<.05
in the income-decrease condition showed that only the lowest asset level
differed significantly from the higher asset levels (the difference between
the second lowest and highest asset level approached significance at
p=.087).
The propensity to pay in cash was greater in the condition saving to
have a buffer and buying something long desired (M = 68.4) than in the
condition saving for a goal and replacing something broken (M = 50.7).
This was not expected but the difference between the conditions did not
reach significance (p>.20). There were furthermore no significant
interaction effects involving differences between the conditions.
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Figure 2. Mean propensity to pay in cash for different income-change
conditions and asset levels.
Discussion
The results further validated the impact of mental accounts on specific
payment decisions. Subjects were more willing to pay in cash in the
income-increase conditions where they could use current income than
when they had to use current savings for paying in cash. They were
furthermore more willing to pay in cash in the ordinary-income conditions
where some current income could be used than in the income-decrease
conditions where only current assets had to be used.
The hypothesis that total assets have an effect on the propensity to pay
in cash only for the negative event of receiving an income decrease was
supported. However, the effect was only observed for the lowest asset
level. One possible explanation (suggested above to account for the results
of Experiment 1) is that subjects impose a limit on how much they are
willing to use of their savings and that they may adjust this limit to the
amount of savings they have. If so, the effect of total assets on the
propensity to pay in cash after an income decrease will be counteracted.
It was expected that buying to replace something broken when saving
to attain a desired goal would lead to a greater propensity to pay in cash
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than buying something long desired when saving in order to have a buffer
for unforeseen expenses. This was expected on the basis of the results of
Experiment 1. The tentative explanation was that the motives for saving
and consumption were noncompatible in the latter condition while both
noncompatible and compatible in the former condition. The results tended
to be in the opposite direction to what was expected. Although
nonsignificant, these contradicting results make the interpretation
difficult. It is not necessarily false that the saving to attain a desired goal
condition induced mixed motives. With mixed saving motives, subjects
may perceive the different consumption motives either as compatible or
noncompatible, or both. An unambiguous prediction may therefore be
difficult to make.
General Discussion
The present study aimed at showing the effect of mental accounts
(Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992) on specific economic decisions and to
investigate the importance of compatibility between saving and
consumption motives and amount of total assets for the willingness to use
current savings. According to Shefrin and Thaler (1988, 1992), people
impose restrictions on their assets and are more reluctant to use current
assets than current income for consumption. This use of mental accounts
may serve the purpose of a more general self-control device, with the use
of current income for more immediate and current assets for future
spending. An important factor enhancing the use of current assets may be
the compatibility between the motive held for savings and the motive for
consumption. If motives for saving and consumption are compatible, it
was expected that the reluctance to use current savings would decrease.
The results of both experiments supported the use of mental accounts
in specific payment decisions. Subjects were more prone to pay
immediately in cash when a current income was available than when they
had to use current savings. This was found when total assets were equal
(Experiment 1) as well as when total assets were greater when using
current savings (some situations in Experiment 2). In adjustments to
temporary income changes, people thus seem to be more concerned about
preserving current assets, as when receiving an income decrease, than to
increase current assets to the same level when receiving an income
increase. It should furthermore be noted that this support for the role of
mental accounts in economic decisions is an extension of the results of
Shefrin and Thaler (1988, 1992) who only obtained support for the use of
mental accounts in subjects’ expectations of future consumption from
different mental accounts.
In Experiment 1, the expected decrease in reluctance to use current
savings when motives for saving and consumption were compatible was
partly supported. When the saving motive was to have a buffer, the
propensity to use current savings to pay in cash was greater for the
No. 5:27, 15
compatible consumption motive to replace something accidentally broken
than for the noncompatible motive to buy something desired for a long
time. When the saving motive was to be able to buy something desired,
there were no differences in the propensity to pay in cash for the
compatible and noncompatible consumption motives. It was suggested
that the absence of a compatibility effect for the saving to attain a desired
goal motive could be due to perceiving this motive as mixed. Hence, even
if compatibility effects in mental accounting are partly supported, the
results indicated that what is perceived as compatibility between saving
and consumption motives may be complex.
In Experiment 2, due to a more comprehensive processing of negative
events (Peeters & Czapinski, 1991; Taylor, 1990), it was expected that
subjects would only take total assets into account when receiving an
income decrease. The results supported this expectation in showing that
different asset levels only had an effect on the propensity to pay in cash
for an income decrease and not for an ordinary income or an income
increase. However, this effect only showed up in a significant difference
between the lowest and second lowest asset levels. One possible
explanation of this weaker effect of asset level is that subjects impose a
limit on how much they are willing to use of their savings and that they
adjust this limit to the amount of savings they have. It could also be the
case that this weaker increase in propensity to pay in cash with
increasing asset levels is due to a diminishing sensitivity to value
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
The effects of mental accounts in the present study is in conflict with
the assumption in expected utility theory that decisions should be made
taking into account total assets (von Neuman & Morgenstern, 1947). It
furthermore violates the principle of fungability of money (Thaler, 1985,
1990). Subjects may nevertheless have a rationale for using mental
accounts, applying them as a general self-control device. An important
question is to what extent these results from a fictitious buying situation
are possible to extend to real-life situations. On the one hand, one may
expect subjects to be more rational, in the sense of behaving in line with
normative theory, when responding to fictitious situations. On the other
hand, one may expect that people in real-life situations are influenced by
other factors such as temptation and impulsiveness. Such factors may
decrease the effectiveness of mental accounts as a self-control device.
Hence, the incentives to use mental accounts may be greater in real life
but may at the same time be harder to apply. It is reasonable to think
that the pronounced use of mental accounts in the present experiments
also to some degree extend to real-life situations.
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